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POLITICAL ECONOMY†
Health and Democracy
By TIMOTHY BESLEY AND MASAYUKI KUDAMATSU*
In spite of the inexorable march of democ-
racy around the globe, just how democratic in-
stitutions affect human well-being is open to
debate. The evidence that democracy promotes
prosperity is neither strong nor robust. More-
over, which aspects of policy making and hu-
man well-being are promoted by democracies is
still a subject of debate.1
Even if correlations between democracy and
outcome measures can be found, there is an
overriding difficulty of interpreting them as
causal effects. Whether democracy matters, per
se, or simply serves as a proxy for societal and
political development presents a difficult prob-
lem for research in this area. Thinkers such as
Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) have argued that
democracy can thrive only when conditions are
right. If this is correct, then becoming demo-
cratic may serve only as a proxy for these hard-
to-measure cultural and societal preconditions.
This paper explores these issues further by
reconsidering the link between democracy and
health using panel data from a cross section of
countries. The data show a strong (conditional)
correlation between life expectancy and democ-
racy. This relationship is robust to controlling
for the initial level of human capital as well as
political histories. The data also suggest that
health policy interventions are superior in
democracies.
I. Background
Human history has witnessed remarkable in-
creases in life expectancy alongside increases in
prosperity. Samuel H. Preston (1975) showed
that this relationship is nonlinear, with the larg-
est gains in life expectancy being associated
with increases in income per capita at low in-
comes. These increases in life expectancy can
be traced to three factors, all of which are as-
sociated with increases in prosperity, although
the direction of causation is hard to establish.2
First, there are reductions in malnutrition and
improvements in infrastructure such as clean
water supply and improved sanitation facilities.
Second, and very important in recent history,
there is medical intervention through control
(due to immunization and insecticides) and
treatment of infectious diseases using antibiot-
ics (see, for example, Davidson Gwatkin,
1980). Third, there are improvements in knowl-
edge and lifestyle. Angus S. Deaton (2004,
p.109) notes that “health improvement ulti-
mately came from the globalization of knowl-
edge, facilitated by local political, economic,
and educational conditions.” The literature to
date has focused more on the latter influences
(education and economics) rather than the po-
litical foundations of increased life expectancy.
There are three main theoretical differences
between democracies and autocracies that we
might expect to influence health issues. The first
concerns representation. Daron Acemoglu and
James Robinson (2005) focus on who controls
political office, modeling autocracy as a dicta-
torship of the rich and democracy as a dictator-
ship of the poor or middle classes. In this view,
health indicators will improve if public health is
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more of a priority for groups who dominate
under a democracy compared to those who gain
political influence in an autocracy. An effect on
health seems plausible in this view, to the extent
that the rich have less interest in public solu-
tions to health problems.
A second view of the difference between
democracy and autocracy emphasizes account-
ability structures. Democracies demand ac-
countability to a broad set of citizens at regular
intervals, whereas autocrats are accountable
only to a smaller group such as the military.
Moreover, autocrats typically repress political
opposition and the media to stifle public policy
debate. This view also predicts that greater at-
tention will be paid to health issues in democ-
racies since failure to do so should result in
leaders being removed from office—this link
being weaker in autocracies.
A third difference between democracies and
autocracies concerns the process of political
selection, with democracies having stronger
mechanisms for selecting competent and honest
leaders to implement policy. To the extent that
health interventions are supported by skilled
and incorruptible political leaders, democracies
should lead to better health outcomes than
autocracies.
There are conflicting views about whether
democracy affects policy and economic perfor-
mance. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Li-
mongi (1993) review empirical research on the
effect of democracy on economic growth, con-
cluding that the correlation is weak and not
robust. Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini
(2005) try a novel econometric approach, find-
ing some support for the proposition that persis-
tent democracy is associated with improvements
in economic performance.
There is a small literature that looks at the
relationship between life expectancy and de-
mocracy in cross-country data. Alvaro Franco et
al. (2004) report a positive correlation between
life expectancy and democracy (see also
Ramesh Govindaraj and Ravindra Rannan-
Eliya, 1994). David A. Lake and Matthew A.
Baum (2001) relate democracy to a variety of
public health interventions.
II. Evidence
We use panel data across countries from the
1960s to the 2000s. We begin by showing there
is a strong and robust correlation between life
expectancy at birth and democracy after con-
trolling for income. Our basic specification uses
data for every fifth year between 1962 and
2002. We estimate an equation of the form:
(1) hsrt  r  t  1 dsrt  2 Dsrt  1 ysrt
 2 ysrt 2  xsr srt
where hsrt is some health indicator in country s,
in region r, and in year t; r is a region dummy
variable; t is a year dummy variable; ysrt is
income per capita in country s, in region r,
averaged over years t  4 to t; and xsr is other
time invariant exogenous variables such as legal
origins and political history. The variables (dsrt,
Dsrt) are measures of democracy.3 The first is a
contemporaneous measure denoting the fraction
of democratic years between year t  4 and t,
while Dsrt is a longer-term one denoting the
fraction of democratic years since 1956, until
year t.4 The variable srt is an error for which
we compute robust standard errors clustered at
the country level. The main concern in interpret-
ing results stems from the possibility that, as ar-
gued by Lipset (1959), there are social and
cultural factors that evolve and make it easier for
democratic institutions to be supported. If such
factors exist, then we would spuriously attribute a
direct effect of democracy on outcomes.
Table 1 presents the basic results. In column
1, we look solely at the partial relationship with
contemporaneous democracy, finding that being
democratic is associated with a 3.5-year in-
crease in life expectancy. In column 2, we add
income per capita measures. After controlling
for income, the democracy effect falls to around
two years, but remains positive and significant.
Column 3 adds the fraction of democratic years
since 1956. The data suggest that it is more
permanent democratic transitions that matter
and the contemporaneous democracy effect is
no longer significant, although an F-test indi-
cates that the two democracy variables are
jointly significant. The point estimate suggests
that a country that has been democratic for the
whole period, from 1956 through year t, has a
3 A country year is defined as democratic if variable
POLITY2 from the POLITY IV database is positive.
4 Philip Keefer (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2005)
argue that longer-lived democratic experience is important.
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life expectancy that is more than five years
higher than a country that has been autocratic
since 1956. To put this in perspective, this point
estimate “explains” 3.5 of the 13.7-year life
expectancy difference between Ghana (demo-
cratic for 11 out of 47 years) and the United
States (always democratic) in 2002. In column
4, we report the results from regressing infant
mortality on the same set of regressors as in
column 3. This shows countries that have been
democratic since 1956 have fewer infants dying
before reaching the age of one, by about 17 per
1,000 live births (about one-fourth of the sam-
ple mean), than countries that have been con-
tinuously autocratic since 1956.
Table 2 looks at the possibility that democ-
racy is correlated with existing values and,
hence, not picking up an institutional effect. In
column 1, we include country fixed effects. In
this case, the democracy effect is no longer
present. It could be symptomatic of some omit-
ted common factor driving both democracy and
life expectancy. In column 2, we confine the
within-country analysis to a balanced panel of
21 countries that have made a consolidated
democratic transition in the period that we look
at, i.e., a single switch to democracy, which is
maintained until 2002. For this subgroup of
countries, the significant democracy effect re-
mains and is larger (by two years) than the
effect seen in Table 1, column 3. Table 2, col-
umn 3, returns to the basic specification studied
in Table 1 and adds measures of political history
as controls. Specifically, it includes the fraction of
years between 1900 and 1955 for which the coun-
try was democratic, and the fraction of years in the
same period for which the country was a colony.
Neither of these is significant, although the effect
of democratic years since 1956 remains.
Column 4 controls for the stock of education
in the population above 15 years of age in 1960,
using data from Robert Barro and Jong-Wha
Lee (2001). Prerequisites for democracy are
likely to be correlated with human capital, and
Edward L. Glaeser et al. (2005) have recently
argued that education affects the sustainability
TABLE 1—HEALTH AND DEMOCRACY
Life expectancy at birth
Infant
mortality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
DEMOCRACY 3.55*** 2.44** 0.24 2.09
since t  4 [1.26] [0.96] [1.14] [5.36]
INCOME 1.75*** 1.61*** 9.19***
[0.22] [0.22] [1.15]
INCOME squared 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.32***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.04]
DEMOCRACY 5.39*** 17.41**
since 1956 [1.65] [8.17]
F-test 7.297 4.482
p-value 0.001 0.013
Controls:
Legal origins YES YES YES YES
Regions YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Countries 160 146 145 146
Observations 1,309 999 996 543
Adjusted R2 0.991 0.994 0.994 0.921
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in brackets. The sample
years are every fifth year from 1962 to 2002 for columns 1–3 and every tenth year from 1960
to 2000 for column 4. DEMOCRACY is the fraction of democratic years for the specified
period. INCOME is per capita income (in thousand constant 1996 international dollars)
averaged over years t  4 to t. Germany drops from the sample for columns 3 and 4 because
DEMOCRACY since 1956 is difficult to measure. The null for F-test is that coefficients on
DEMOCRACY since t  4 and since 1956 are both zero.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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of democratic institutions. Education is posi-
tively related to life expectancy. The democracy
variable remains positive and significant, how-
ever, although slightly smaller in size compared
to column 3 in Table 1.5
Finally, Table 3 looks for evidence of differ-
ences in policy priorities between democracies
and autocracies. In columns 1 and 2, we inves-
tigate the difference in sanitation and clean
water supply between democratic and nondem-
ocratic countries. These two health infrastruc-
tures prevent deaths caused by diarrhea,
typhoid, and cholera. We see that the percentage
of the population with access to improved san-
itation facilities and improved water sources is
higher by about 15 points (25 percent of the
sample mean) and about 11 points (14 percent
of the sample mean), respectively, in permanent
democracies since 1956 than in permanent
autocracies.
In columns 3 and 4, we explore the relation-
ship between democracy and immunization.
The latter is mainly a key preventive measure
against airborne infectious diseases.6 We find
the percentage of children aged 12 to 23 months
who received DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and
tetanus) vaccination before the age of one is
5 The longer version of this paper shows that the results
are robust to including a wide array of other variables as
well as alternative ways of measuring democracy.
6 As immunization data are observed annually, we re-
place hsrt in equation (1) with a health indicator averaged
over the period from t  4 to t, where t is a five-year interval
between 1985 and 2000. We also substitute Dsrt5 for Dsrt
to avoid the overlap between the two variables.
TABLE 2—ROBUSTNESS TO LIPSET’S HYPOTHESIS
(The dependent variable: Life expectancy at birth)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEMOCRACY since 1956 0.08 7.65** 5.49*** 4.09**
[1.02] [3.26] [1.45] [1.60]
INCOME 0.28* 0.37 1.62*** 1.48***
[0.15] [0.55] [0.23] [0.26]
(INCOME)2 0.01*** 0.03 0.05*** 0.05***
[0.00] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01]
DEMOCRACY for 1900–1955 0.92 2.98
[1.59] [1.97]
COLONY for 1900–1955 0.57 1.71
[1.13] [1.25]
SCHOOLING in 1960 1.19***
[0.41]
Controlled dummies:
Countries YES YES NO NO
Legal origins NO NO YES YES
Regions NO NO YES YES
Years YES YES YES YES
SE clustered? NO NO YES YES
Countries 145 21 144 92
Observations 996 189 993 752
Adjusted R2 0.998 0.998 0.994 0.995
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at country level for columns 3 and 4) are reported in
brackets. The sample years are every fifth year from 1962 to 2002. Column 2 restricts the
sample to those countries, observed for all the nine sample years, that were nondemocratic in
1956, democratized only once by 2002, and have been democratic ever since. COLONY is the
fraction of colonial years for the specified period. SCHOOLING is the average years of
schooling in the population aged over 15. Yemen is dropped from the sample for columns 3
and 4 as it is difficult to obtain DEMOCRACY for 1900–1955 and COLONY for 1900–1955.
Germany is dropped from the samples for all columns (see notes for Table 1).
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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higher by about nine points (more than 10 per-
cent of the sample mean) in democracies com-
pared to autocracies. For measles vaccination,
democracy variables are not significant, while
former colonies have lower immunization rates.7
Finally, column 5 investigates the relation-
ship between democracy and government health
expenditures per capita (excluding expenditures
on water and sanitation provision). The specifi-
cation is the same as in columns 3 and 4, with
data available only for the year 2000. This sug-
gests that governments in “permanent” democ-
racy spend around $160 (in purchasing power
parity terms) per person more on health than
those in “permanent” autocracy.
III. Conclusion
Our results suggest that there is a robust
correlation between democratic institutions and
health, resulting in greater life expectancy in
democracies. The fact that these results are ro-
bust to including education and political history
as regressors, or including country fixed effects
in a sample of countries that made a consoli-
dated transition to democracy during our sam-
ple period, is encouraging to the view that
political institutions matter.
The results contribute to a growing body of
the literature that takes political economy
factors seriously in understanding human
well-being. The challenge now is to take this
agenda beyond broad cross-country compari-
sons and into the detailed workings of political
and bureaucratic behavior under different sys-
tems of government.
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